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Abstract: This paper discusses the costs and benefits of welfare state intervention in the 
labour market, and argues that many forms of intervention can be justified for efficiency 
reasons. The paper reviews recent evidence on income inequality and income mobility, and it 
discusses labour market reforms that may improve efficiency without violating European 
voters’ preference for equality. 
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Unemployment in the United States stood at 6.8 percent in 1991, and dropped to a post-war 
low of 4.0 percent in 2000.
1 At the same time leading European economies struggled to keep 
their unemployment rates below 10 percent. The average unemployment rate in the European 
Union was 8.1 percent in 1991, increased to 10.6 percent in 1996, and fell back to 8.1 percent 
in 2000. In the United States only 6 percent of total unemployment in the year 2000 consisted 
of people who had been unemployed for at least a year. In Germany, Belgium and Italy long-
term unemployment was more than 50 percent of the total. Between 1991-2000 the US 
economy created 17.5 million additional jobs (an increase by 15 percent), while the European 
Union only created 12.4 million additional jobs (an increase by 8 percent).  
The marked contrast between U.S. and European labour market performance is often 
attributed to the lack of flexibility in European labour markets. Today many economists agree 
that generous social insurance, employment protection, minimum wages and centralized wage 
determination create much wastage, in the form of unemployment, and compressed wage 
structures that distort people’s incentives to look for new jobs and invest in human capital. As 
a corollary, it is often argued that far-reaching labour market deregulation is the only way to 
create a job miracle in European labour markets.  
In this paper I will agree that some European institutions create inefficiencies, with 
small or no compensating gains in terms of equity/income security. I also believe that the U.S. 
welfare reforms of the 1990s offer useful lessons for European policy-makers. But my main 
message is that Europeans should not throw out the baby with the bathwater. There is in fact 
both a cost and a benefit side to labour market institutions. Although it seems likely that 
certain institutions create unemployment, others may in fact serve quite useful purposes. 
Reforms failing to distinguish between good and bad rigidities will do more harm than good.  
                                                 
1 The facts in this paragraph are taken from the OECD Employment Outlook (2002).   2
A basic objection to the view that adverse European institutions is the only factor 
behind the US-European divergence in labour market performance is that most European 
countries had in fact lower, or much lower, unemployment rates than the United States in the 
1960s and early 1970s. As noted by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Bertola, Blau and 
Kahn (2001) most of today’s institutions were in fact the same already in the early 1960s. 
This makes it unlikely that adverse institutions can be the only factor behind the more recent 
developments. It appears likely that macroeconomic events, and their interactions with 
institutions, play important roles as well; see e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Bertola, 
Blau and Kahn (2001). Moreover, as stressed by Nickell (1997) there is large diversity within 
Europe. Though persistent unemployment is a serious issue in Germany, Italy and Spain, 
several of the smaller European countries have for long had unemployment rates on par with, 
or even below, the United States. This includes Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and 
Austria, countries with extensive welfare states, encompassing institutions of collective 
bargaining, and – with the exception of Denmark – strict job protection. At the same time, it is 
noteworthy that the United Kingdom, which deregulated its labour markets in the 1980s, did 
not fare significantly better than the average European economy during the 1990s.
2 
 
2. Labour market institutions in second-best environments 
Every student of economics knows that an efficient resource allocation will emerge if all 
agents in the labour market are price takers, and if there is a complete set of markets. The 
resulting allocation need not be an equitable one, but it will maximize the size of the pie (i.e. 
the sum of all producer and consumer surpluses). Viewed against the yardstick of such an 
idealized competitive environment, European-style labour market institutions are bound to 
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create efficiency losses. Unions and minimum wages that push up the wages of low-skilled 
workers will reduce output and create unskilled unemployment. Taxation and generous social 
insurance will provide workers with an incentive to replace work in the high-productive 
market sector with less productive leisure and activities in the underground economy. 
  Viewed against the yardstick of an economy with pre-existing market failures matters 
need not be so bleak. It is a standard result in welfare economics that because of externalities, 
public goods, increasing returns and asymmetric information there is – at least in theory – a 
case for government intervention. These market failures may also explain why labour market 
institutions that e.g. compress wages can improve efficiency. A classic example is that of the 
employment and welfare effects of minimum wages. When the minimum wage is introduced 
in a perfectly competitive economy it is bound to reduce efficiency. But when it is introduced 
in a labour market where the firm has all the market power the firm is provided with the 
incentive to increase employment towards the first-best level.  
  A recent literature has explored the implications of labour market models that 
incorporate the standard market failures of welfare economics. A main theme of these papers 
is that many of the labour market institutions that have quite detrimental effects in perfectly 
competitive environments may have a beneficial impact in models with pre-existing market 
failures.
3 This is not the time to review this literature, which covers a lot of ground. Instead, I 
will briefly discuss under what conditions institutional wage compression – a hallmark of 
European labour markets – can in fact be motivated for reasons of economic efficiency.  
Missing insurance markets. It has been said that “Uncertainty and expectations are the 
joys of life”.
4 But for risk-averse individuals uncertainty should be a cause of concern. For 
most individuals human capital is by far the most important asset. Yet, the private insurance 
market will not accommodate people’s demand for protection against a variety of risks that 
                                                 
3 See e.g. Agell and Lommerud (1992, 1997) on institutional wage compression, Atkinson (1999) and Acemoglu 
and Shimer (1999) on unemployment benefits, and Pissarides (2001) on employment protection.    4
originate in the labour market. In particular, for reasons of asymmetric information, and 
because of the problems of enforcing long-run insurance contracts involving human capital, 
the insurance industry will not provide protection against long-term career risk.
5 
  It is a standard result that missing insurance markets suggests an important role for 
government redistribution policy. By reducing the variance of disposable income, a system of 
redistributive taxes and transfers may improve welfare by providing an insurance effect in 
addition to the conventional incentive and equity effects. Several authors have even suggested 
that missing insurance markets explains why the modern tax-financed welfare state fulfils an 
important efficiency purpose, which goes beyond conventional justifications in terms of 
fairness and equality; cf. Atkinson (1991, 1999), Barr (1998) and Sandmo (1991, 1998). 
Though the welfare state imposes tax wedges that are detrimental to economic efficiency, 
voters are willing to pay this cost because they receive compensating insurance benefits.  
  But income redistribution via the welfare state is not the only way of purchasing 
insurance against the uncertainties of the future. Insurance can also be provided through 
labour market institutions (egalitarian unions, minimum wage legislation and unemployment 
insurance) that narrow the earnings distribution. As discussed by Agell and Lommerud 
(1992), under general assumptions the insurance benefits from a “small” compression of the 
wage distribution will outweigh any efficiency losses imposed on the economy. It is important 
to note that in this analysis egalitarian unions do create unemployment among their unskilled 
members, but in spite of this the expected utility of the average worker will be higher than in a 
laissez-faire economy with no unemployment. In the model of Agell and Lommerud 
unemployment is simply the cost associated with a second-best insurance contract.  
  As pointed out by Sinn (1995) the social insurance approach to the institutions of the 
welfare state has an intriguing implication. It is a common belief that the high taxes of the 
                                                                                                                                                          
4 Congreve, Love for love, as quoted by Hicks (1946, p. 189).  
5 For a discussion stressing the inability of insurance markets to handle career risk, see Sinn (1996).    5
welfare state are necessarily bad for investments and entrepreneurship. But Sinn shows that 
properly designed welfare institutions may in fact encourage people to undertake risky 
activities. Sinn extends the model of social insurance via the tax system to the case when 
individuals can invest in risky activities, and he shows that the insurance provided via 
redistributive taxes and benefits may lead to increased investments in risky activities. In the 
words of Sinn “…under the protection of the welfare state more can be dared”.  
  The idea that properly designed social insurance may encourage risk taking and 
productive investments is in fact an old one. In defending social insurance against the 
supporters of laissez faire, Cassel (1900) wrote approvingly of a social policy aimed at 
protecting the working class. He argued that social policy was a powerful instrument to 
promote economic progress, and to induce people to accept change. He even went so far so as 
to state that “…the main point in defence of this policy must rest in the acknowledgement that 
the productivity of labour increases in parallel with the social position of the working class. 
The insight about this relationship is the most optimistic, but at the same time one of the most 
well-established, results of modern economic research.” (Cassel, 1900, p. 387-388). 
Wage compression and incentives for human capital formation. A very common 
argument in the debate about European labour markets is that a compressed wage structure 
reduces people’s incentives to acquire human capital. As governments and egalitarian unions 
attempt to raise the pay of those at the low-end of the skill distribution they also reduce the 
return on investments in education and training. As a consequence there will be too little 
investment in human capital.  
  Recent work suggests that this argument needs to be qualified. Institutional 
compression of the wage structure from below may in fact initiate push-effects, which counter 
the traditional disincentive effect from wage compression. The schooling decision depends on 
the return to schooling. But what is forgotten in the traditional analysis is that it will also   6
depend on the skill requirements of firms. When the relative wage of unskilled workers 
increases firms hire fewer workers with little schooling and experience. To avoid 
unemployment, and to get access to the primary job market, young people will then simply 
have to acquire more schooling.
6 As shown by Cahuc and Michel (1996), Agell and 
Lommerud (1997) and Ravn and Sørensen (1997) it is not difficult to write down models in 
which a binding minimum wage for unskilled workers will lead to a more highly educated 
workforce. It is important to note that it is the very fact that the minimum wage creates 
unemployment among unskilled workers (i.e. the standard objection to minimum wages) that 
leads to an upgrading of the human capital stock.  
  Kahn (2000) reports some empirical support for this mechanism. Using micro-data for 
15 OECD countries Kahn finds that greater union coverage/union membership leads to higher 
relative wages and lower employment for young men. The effects for young women are 
similar but weaker. Interestingly, Kahn reports that greater union coverage/union membership 
also leads to a greater propensity to attend school for both genders. These correlations are 
exactly what we would expect from the theoretical arguments of the preceding paragraph.  
  A related analysis of the link between wage compression and human capital formation 
is provided by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), who concentrate on on-the-job training. In their 
model various frictions in the labour market are assumed to lock a firm and its employees into 
a bilateral monopoly situation. In the local wage bargain the firm will therefore be able to 
appropriate part of the returns to workers’ investments in general training. Because workers 
anticipate this, they may end up not investing in general training. Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1999) show that the firm may want to compensate for this by investing resources in the 
general skills of their employees. They also show that such firm-sponsored investments 
should be more common when the wage structure is compressed against skilled workers.  
                                                 
6 In effect, low skilled unemployment lowers the opportunity cost of going to school. It is important to note that 
for this effect to occur it must be unpleasant to be unemployed. With very generous unemployment   7
  Summing up, it is often taken for granted that unions, and the welfare state, might be 
good for reasons of equity, but that these institutions are harmful to economic efficiency. 
Here, we have seen that it is in fact possible to find efficiency-based justifications for unions 
and the welfare state. Obviously, this does not imply that today’s labour market institutions in 
Europe are without faults. As I will discuss below, many institutions appear to be designed in 
ways that impose deadweight burdens that are unnecessarily large. But the research reviewed 
in this section suggests that supporters of a big-bang approach to European labour market 
reform have an unbalanced case. The intellectual support for the idea that only far-reaching 
labour market deregulation can restore European prosperity can be traced to investigations 
that assume that the appropriate benchmark when discussing European institutions is a 
perfectly competitive labour market.
7 Though such an approach might be useful in mapping 
out the costs of labour market institutions, it has nothing to say about the potential benefits.  
 
3. Inequality, poverty and income mobility 
The traditional motivation for many of the institutional arrangements in European labour 
markets is that they promote fairness and egalitarian outcomes. More recently, however, a 
growing number of critics have argued that also those in favour of equity and income 
inequality have reason to reconsider these institutions. It is argued that the welfare states of 
Northern Europe create inequality/poverty by protecting the interests of employed insiders at 
the expense unemployed outsiders. It is also argued that welfare states tend to be static 
societies with little income mobility, and that large segments of the populations of these 
countries are locked into long-term dependence on social assistance. By contrast, it is often 
argued that the flexible labour markets of the United States provide poor people with 
significantly greater opportunity for upward income mobility. 
                                                                                                                                                          
benefits/social assistance the push incentive to acquire schooling will not be operational.  
7 Agell (1999) provides references.    8
This section briefly reviews some basic facts and research on income inequality, 
poverty and income mobility in different countries. Most of my discussion focuses on a 
comparison between the United States and the United Kingdom (i.e. countries with flexible 
labour markets) and European countries with rigid labour markets. I will rely heavily on 
evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).
8 LIS comprises household survey data 
for 26 industrialized countries. Though cross-country comparisons of income inequality are 
subject to a number of methodological problems, LIS is most certainly the most reliable 
source of such information. First, over the years much has been invested in achieving 
comparability across countries. Second, it is well known that the inequality of earnings is 
much smaller in many European countries than it is in the United States. But since statistics 
on earnings inequality exclude the long-term unemployed, which is a sizeable group in some 
European countries, such comparisons will overstate equality in Europe; see Heckman (2001). 
Since the LIS project allows for a systematic comparison of the distribution of disposable 
income in random household samples, this bias is avoided.  
  Table 1 presents some basic statistics on income inequality and poverty. For each 
country the figures refer to the most recently available year, which typically is a year in the 
mid to late 1990s.
9 The first column shows the ratio of the disposable incomes of the persons 
at the bottom and top deciles. This “decile ratio” is easy to interpret, and it allows for a direct 
comparison of the distance between people at the top and bottom of the income distribution. 
As noted by Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Björklund (1998) and Smeeding (2002) 
countries tend to cluster into different geographical groups. Income differentials are the 
smallest in Scandinavia (Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway) and parts of Northern 
Europe (Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany and Belgium), with decile ratios below or 
around 3. Parts of Continental Europe come next; in France, Switzerland and Austria decile 
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ratios range from 3.54 to 3.73. Income inequality is the highest in Southern Europe (Spain and 
Italy) and the English speaking countries of Canada, Australia, Ireland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, where the decile ratios typically exceed 4. The biggest distance 
between rich and poor is in the United States, where the ratio is 5.57. This is about twice the 
ratio that can be found in the quartet of Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg and Denmark.  
  The indicators shown in the following columns convey a similar picture. The Gini 
coefficient is a commonly used global inequality measure, which takes a value of zero in a 
country where everyone has the same disposable income, and a value of unity in a country 
where a single individual earns all income. Column 2 shows that the ranking of countries 
remains almost the same as in column 1. Scandinavia and Northern Europe have Gini 
coefficients falling between .22 and .26; the United Kingdom and the United States have Gini 
coefficients of .344 and .372. By the standard of Gini comparisons this is a large discrepancy. 
A common measure of inequality at the lower end of the income distribution is the 
relative poverty rate, shown in column 3. This column shows the percentage of the population 
with an income below 50 percent of the median income (poverty researcher sometimes view 
this as an indicator of the extent of social exclusion in society). Relative poverty is the lowest 
in Scandinavia and Northern Europe, and the highest in Southern Europe and the English-
speaking countries. The United States has the highest relative poverty rate, 17 percent.  
It could be argued that poverty among healthy adults is a lesser problem; a poor 
individual could simply be someone with a preference for consuming leisure rather than 
consumption goods. However, this argument does not apply to children. Column 4 shows that 
the imbalances in relative poverty rates across countries grow larger when we confine 
attention to the distribution of disposable income among children. Some of the Scandinavian 
welfare states spend large sums to support families with children, and the relative poverty 
                                                                                                                                                          
9 These results are directly available at the LIS home page: www.lisproject.org/keyfigures. Smeeding (2002) 
discusses issues of measurement and comparability.    10
rates among children in Finland and Sweden are below 3 percent. The relative poverty rates 
among children in the United Kingdom and the United States are 15.4 and 21.9 percent.  
  Finally, it is of interest to measure poverty using an absolute rather than relative 
measurement rod. Using the official poverty rate of the United States as the relevant 
(purchasing power adjusted) standard in all countries, Bradbury and Jäntti (2002) compute the 
share of children in each country that can be classified as living in absolute poverty. Their 
results are shown in column 5. Though GDP per capita is some 30 percent larger in the United 
States than in Scandinavia and Northern Europe, the United States has the highest incidence 
of absolute child poverty. While 13.9 percent of children in the United States live in poverty, 
the corresponding figures are 1.2 percent in Luxembourg, 3.0 percent in Norway, 5.1 percent 
in Denmark, 5.3 percent in Sweden, and 6.9 percent in Finland. Finally, the incidence of 
absolute child poverty in the United Kingdom – a country with a GDP per capita on par with 
Finland and Sweden – is as high as 29.1 percent.  
  The conclusion from these comparisons seems to be that the institutions of 
Scandinavia and Northern Europe are – whatever their efficiency costs may be – relatively 
successful in achieving economic equality. According to the criteria used by distribution 
analysts and poverty researchers the institutions of the United States and the United Kingdom 
create more inequality, and more poverty, among children and among the population at large. 
It should be noted that the poor showing of the United States in Table 1 occurs in spite of a 
decade with rapid employment growth in the American labour market. Thus, a job miracle is 
no cure-all for the problems of inequality and poverty.  
An objection to these comparisons is that they rely on data for a single year. The fact 
that the welfare states of Scandinavia and Northern Europe seem to be doing rather well in 
equalizing incomes could simply be an artefact from measuring incomes over too short 
periods. In societies with much upward income mobility, which is often thought to be the case   11
in the United States, the inequality of annual income will exaggerate the inequality of long 
run – or permanent – income. Because of high income mobility, the inequality of permanent 
income in the United States might in fact be low, in spite of high inequality of annual income.  
A recent analysis of this issue is provided by Aaberge et al. (2002). This paper 
compares income inequality and income mobility in the Scandinavian countries and the 
United States during the period 1980-90. The results suggest that inequality of annual income 
is far greater in the United States, but it is also shown that this continues to be the case when 
the accounting period is extended from one to eleven years. Other results are that there is no 
unequivocal way of ranking different countries in terms of income mobility, and that the 
mobility differences between countries appear to be small. In a related analysis Burkhauser 
and Poupore (1997) study income mobility in Germany and the United States over the five-
year period 1983-1988. They find that Germany and the United States have remarkably 
similar mobility patterns. Duncan et al. (1993) compare transitions in and out of poverty in 
eight countries, including e.g. the United States, Germany (not including former East 
Germany), France, the Netherlands, and Sweden. They conclude that the “…extent of upward 
mobility appears to be just as great among the poor in Europe as among US poor” (Duncan et 
al. (1993, p. 229)).  
A more long-term perspective on income mobility is provided by the literature on 
intergenerational income mobility. Here, the issue at stake is the correlation between the 
earnings of fathers and sons. In a society where this correlation is close to zero there will be a 
high degree of intergenerational mobility, in the sense that the earnings of the father will not 
condition the earnings of his son. The recent review of Solon (2002) suggests – very much 
contrary to the popular belief – that there is less intergenerational mobility in the United 
States and the United Kingdom than in other countries. While studies for these two countries   12
report correlations in excess of .4, studies for Sweden, Finland and Germany report 
correlations in a range from .11 to .34.  
  In sum, there is no evidence that high income mobility in the United States – over life-
cycles and across generations – compensates for the higher or much higher rates of income 
inequality and poverty observed in annual income data. The welfare states of Scandinavia and 
Northern Europe have both significantly less cross-sectional inequality and higher 
intergenerational mobility than the United States.
10  
  What institutional characteristics generate equality? Since the welfare states of 
Northern Europe have it all, answering this question in a very precise manner might not be so 
easy. These countries have generous social transfer systems, but they also have labour market 
institutions that compress the distribution of earnings from below, education systems that 
produce a more compressed distribution of human capital, and progressive tax systems. 
Trying to decompose the overall equalising impact of this institutional sum into its component 
parts raises difficult issues in general equilibrium modelling. Nevertheless, Smeeding (2002) 
concludes that explanations for cross-country differences in inequality appear to differ 
according to which end of the income distribution one is studying. Smeeding shows that there 
appears to be a negative relationship between cross-country poverty rates and wages at the 
bottom of the wage distribution. He also shows that there appears to be a negative relationship 
between poverty rates and a country’s social expenditure level as a percentage of GDP.  
I show a similar scatter diagram in Figure 1, which plots the incidence of child poverty 
against total social spending (after deducting cash payments to the elderly) in 18 OECD-
countries.
11 The OLS regression line is downward sloping, with a t-value of 4.98. I also 
checked whether there was a statistically significant correlation between child poverty and the 
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generations might be conducive to intergenerational mobility in society.    13
measure of minimum wages used by e.g. Nickell and Layard (1999). This was not the case, 
however. Though the minimum wage variable did show up with a negative sign in an OLS 
regression, the t-value was only .81.  
 
4. Is the flexible U.S. labour market an appropriate model for Europe?  
The view that major labour market deregulation and scaling down of the welfare state is the 
only way forward rests on two key assumptions. First, it assumes that a deregulated labour 
market is the best way to serve economic efficiency. Second, it assumes that far-reaching 
labour market deregulation and major reform of the welfare state would be of little 
consequence for equality and the fight against poverty. In my view both assumptions are 
dubious, or wrong. Sound principles of welfare economics, and available cross-country 
evidence on income inequality and income mobility, suggest that some rigidities are good for 
economic efficiency, and that the welfare state has been successful in reducing inequality.  
  As noted by Krueger (2002) all societies must find ways of striking a balance between 
the beneficial incentive effects of inequality and the harmful welfare-decreasing effects of 
inequality. This balancing act will depend on the preferences of voters. It will also depend on 
all the factors in the economic environment that impact on voters’ perceptions of the benefits 
and costs from institutions that provide social insurance and redistribute income between rich 
and poor. Here, the important observation is that European voters appear to have a strong 
preference for the welfare state. When Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001) surveyed 
citizens in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, they found that sizeable majorities in all 
countries opposed cuts to social security and welfare spending. A majority of respondents also 
indicated a high willingness to pay for insurance against labour market risk.  
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5. What can be done? 
What labour market reforms may improve economic efficiency without violating European 
voters’ preference for fairness? Answering this question is not so easy. After all, there is not 
supposed to be a free lunch in economics. And since Europe is so diverse optimal reform 
packages will differ quite a lot between countries. The labour market problems of Germany 
are not the same as the problems of Sweden and Italy. Keeping this in mind, I will here stick 
to the safe haven of general reasoning rather than concrete policy advice.  
 
5a) Schooling 
In striking a balance between efficiency and equality, redistributive taxes and transfers are not 
the only available policy instruments. In the long-term, a country’s schooling and training 
policies are more decisive factors.
12 Schooling systems and training programs that are 
successful in upgrading the skills and human capital at the low end of the ability distribution 
yield multiple returns. First, there will be private returns to the individuals involved. Second, 
in countries where voters have an aversion to income dispersion a more compressed 
productivity distribution has a value of its own. Third, a more compressed productivity 
distribution will reduce the need to rely on redistributive taxation, which reduces the dead-
weight loss from taxation (see Dur and Teulings (2002) for a theoretical analysis).  
  The preceding argument has some bearing upon the recent discussion about whether 
the European welfare states should try to create a job miracle of their own by forming a low-
wage service sector without minimum wages and collective bargaining contracts. The largest 
efficiency gains from having such a sector should materialise in countries with a dispersed 
distribution human capital. When a U.S. computer specialist gets some extra time at his office 
by “outsourcing” household production to a lowly educated immigrant worker there will be a 
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large societal gain in the utilisation of the human capital of the former. In European countries, 
where schools and training programs produce a more compressed distribution of skills (see 
e.g. Nickell and Bell (1996)), the gain will be much smaller. Based on this logic, I argue that 
the reason that the unskilled service sector is significantly less important in Northern Europe 
than in the United States probably hinges at least as much on several decades of past 
education policy as on unions and collective bargaining. 
 
5b) The trade-off between generosity and punishments 
Atkinson (1999) points out that critics of social insurance and social policy often tend to 
neglect the importance of institutional detail. The behavioural consequences of a given social 
spending budget will depend crucially on a wide range of design features. Taking 
unemployment benefits as an illustration, Atkinson notes that real-world benefit systems are 
subject to contribution conditions, often prescribe that benefits should have limited duration, 
and may impose active job search requirements. Moreover, persons who quit voluntarily, are 
dismissed because of misconduct, or reject job offers, may be disqualified from receiving 
benefits. Supporters of the big-bang approach rarely acknowledge such fine prints; typically, 
the issue that is stressed is the adverse consequences of generous benefit levels. Yet, Atkinson 
presents several examples of how generous benefits can be made incentive-compatible by 
adding on eligibility and job search requirements, and sanctions for misconduct. 
  These insights are of considerable importance for many areas of social policy design. 
Generous compensation levels in social insurance need not be a problem, as long as there are 
ways of preventing misuse. Spelling out clear eligibility criteria, monitoring compliance and 
imposing sanctions are crucial aspects of optimal social policy design. It appears, however, 
that these issues are often treated with undue neglect. Many governments spend large 
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resources to detect and punish tax evaders, and yet do very little to detect and punish people 
that cheat on social insurance. Recent work by Lalive, van Ours and Zweimuller (2002) 
shows that addressing this imbalance may produce large beneficial responses. Lalive et al. use 
Swiss data to explore the effectiveness of benefit sanctions on unemployment duration, and 
they separate the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility 
requirements from the actual enforcement of the punishment. The results indicate that both 
warning and enforcement have positive effects on the exit rate out of unemployment, and that 
increasing the monitoring intensity reduces the duration of unemployment.  
  Finally, it is of interest to note that recent experimental evidence shows that people are 
willing to invest substantial resources in public goods, as long as they have the possibility to 
inflict punishment on those who free ride on the co-operation of others, see Fehr and Gächter 
(2002). Fehr and Gächter show that free riding triggers strong negative emotions, and that co-
operation may break down altogether in the absence of punishments. Taken at face value 
these results appear to have some profound implications for the organization of the welfare 
state. Majority support for a generous welfare state may require that the government invests 
significant resources in identifying and punishing those engaging in anti-social behaviour.  
 
5c) Labour supply incentives -- the problematic U-curve 
A common characteristic of labour supply incentives in many countries is that workers at the 
low and high ends of the wage distribution face the highest marginal tax rates. In a diagram 
plotting the marginal tax rate on the y-axis and taxable income on the x-axis the schedule of 
marginal tax brackets will be shaped like a U. At the low end, the interaction of income taxes 
and income-dependent transfers (like housing subsidies and social assistance) implies that e.g. 
unskilled, lone parents will be confronted with very high effective marginal tax rates. When 
the marginal tax rate exceeds 100 percent there will be a poverty trap, which effectively   17
discourages labour force participation. At the high end, skilled workers face higher than 
normal marginal tax rates, the reason being that real-world tax systems prescribe that the 
marginal tax rate should be some increasing function of taxable income. Available 
econometric studies of labour supply indicate that the U-curve of labour supply disincentives 
may create potentially large excess burdens.  
  Both practical and theoretical considerations suggest that these problems can be 
mitigated, without compromising distributional objectives. During the 1990s the United States 
greatly expanded the use of the so-called earned income tax credit. This scheme is only 
available to working poor families, and it gives a tax credit directly related to the size of 
earnings and the number of children. The attractive aspect is that it enhances the incomes of 
the working poor, and at the same time provides a substantial boost to work incentives. The 
downside is that for individuals with earned incomes falling in the phase-out range of the tax 
credit there will be an added disincentive effect. However, recent research suggests that the 
earned income tax credit has had a positive net impact on the labour supply of lone mothers.
13 
  When it comes to the high end of the wage distribution the theory of optimal income 
taxation, following Mirrlees (1971), offers some guidance. This theory may appear arcane to 
the non-specialist, but there is one finding of significant policy interest. There is no support at 
all for the common view that equality is best served by a tax system with increasing marginal 
tax rates at the top of the wage distribution. Numerical simulations suggest that marginal tax 
rates should stay fairly constant, or even decrease, as we reach the higher end of the earnings 
distribution, see e.g. Heady (1993). This result applies even when the government cares a lot 
about the utility of the poor: rate cuts that increase the labour supply of high-wage individuals 
provide extra tax revenue that can be redistributed to low-wage individuals.  
 
                                                 
13 See Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001). Blank (2003) makes the important related point that lone mothers also 
need help with adequate day care to ease the transition into permanent jobs.   18
5d) Work and training requirements 
Many empirical studies have documented that paying out generous unemployment benefits or 
cash assistance for long durations generate long-term unemployment; see e.g. Nickell and 
Layard (1999). One way of reducing this problem is to introduce explicit work and/or training 
requirements: after a suitable waiting period, further financial assistance will only be allowed 
if the person accepts to participate in some work or training programme. While some 
European countries already adopt such schemes, the United States has seen a large expansion 
of work programs during the 1990s. A particularly interesting aspect is that the U.S. programs 
have been extensively evaluated using state-of-the-art randomised evaluations; see Blank 
(2002, 2003) for overviews. Blank (2003, p. 59) concludes that there is now a “…substantial 
body of evidence on the effectiveness of welfare-to-work programs in reducing welfare usage 
and public costs, and increasing labour supply.”  
  Blank (2003) also notes that mandatory work requirements (a negative incentive) 
probably work best in combination with a positive incentive, of which the earned income tax 
credit might be a good example. Viewed in isolation welfare-to-work programmes may have a 
significant effect on labour supply, but no effect at all on overall income or poverty. When 
combined with something like the earned income tax credit, there will also be a positive 
income effect that may reduce poverty.  
 
5e) Taming non-coordinated unions  
Cross-country investigations of why unemployment rates differ suggest that co-ordinated 
unions are more likely to consider the aggregate employment consequences when wage 
bargains are struck; see e.g. Nickell and Layard (1999). Such co-ordination will occur 
naturally in countries with highly centralised wage bargaining, like e.g. Austria and the 
Netherlands, or Sweden in the decades following the Second World War. All-encompassing   19
unions operating at the national level may even have an incentive to internalise some of the 
negative incentive effects from high tax wedges; cf. Summers, Gruber and Vergara (1993). 
In many countries unemployment benefits are financed out of general tax money to a 
very large extent. In Sweden, for example, unemployment insurance has traditionally been run 
by the unions in the form of a number of certified unemployment insurance funds. While part 
of the financing stems from union membership fees the government provides large subsidies, 
financed by general tax money. After a design change in the 1980s the membership fee is in 
fact independent of the unemployment rate in the area of the specific fund; in effect, the 
marginal cost of unemployment for a single fund became zero. In an economy with 
centralised bargaining at the national level marginal subsidies on this scale should be of no 
consequence, since the employees’ federation should see through the government’s budget 
constraint, and recognise that higher subsidies means higher taxes on labour.  
In an economy where bargaining rather takes place along sectoral lines, which is the 
case in many European countries, such generous marginal subsidies imply strong incentives 
for macroeconomic free-riding. The cost for the unemployment consequences of excessive 
wage deals in a specific sector can be passed on to tax paying workers in other sectors of the 
labor market. In the resulting Nash equilibrium real wages will be too high, and aggregate 
employment too low. This situation can be remedied by changing the financing of 
unemployment insurance, so that members of sectoral unions have to shoulder a greater part 
of the marginal cost of unemployment; see Holmlund and Lundborg (1988) for an analysis.  
 
6. Will the welfare state survive?
14 
According to the conventional view, increased openness and the requirements imposed by the 
new economy will increase the costs of preserving institutions that hinder the flexible 
                                                 
14 This section draws on Agell (2002).    20
adjustment of relative wages. As a consequence governments sooner or later have to liberalise 
rigid labour market institutions, cut down on generous unemployment insurance, and 
implement measures that restrict the influence of rent seeking unions. But considerations of 
political economy suggest that this process is not automatic.  
Figure 2 shows the marginal costs and benefits of income redistribution, as perceived 
by the decisive voter. Since the excess burden increases with the square of the tax wedge the 
marginal cost curve slopes upwards. Under the plausible assumption that a dollar’s worth of 
income redistribution matters most at a low overall level of income redistribution, the marginal 
benefit curve slopes downwards. In the initial political economy equilibrium, the decisive voter 
chooses the amount of redistribution so that the marginal cost and benefit curves intersect, i.e. 
point A. The popular view assumes that globalisation increases the efficiency costs associated 
with a given level of income redistribution; i.e. the marginal cost curve shifts upwards. We 
then end up in the political economy equilibrium at point B, where the new cost curve 
intersects the old benefit curve. Clearly, there will be less income redistribution. But to the 
extent that globalisation also increases the decisive voter’s demand for social insurance, there 
will in fact be a simultaneous upward shift in the benefit curve. We then end up at point C, 
where the new cost curve intersects the new benefit curve. Whether this final political 
equilibrium is associated with less or more income redistribution is an open question, on which 
it is hard to form a definite a priori opinion.  
The cross-country evidence on the determinants of labour market institutions suggests 
that the analysis of Figure 2 may have some validity. Researchers have long suggested that 
the vulnerability of the open economy provides incentives to increase the scope of 
government. Cameron (1978) showed that the trade to GDP ratio in 1960 was a good 
predictor of the future growth of tax revenue in a sample of 18 OECD. He also found a 
positive correlation between openness and a measure of the scope of collective bargaining.   21
More recently, Rodrik (1998) has found evidence of a robust positive correlation between 
openness and indicators of the size of government in a much larger sample. The explanation 
offered by Rodrik is that government spending plays a risk-reducing role in economies 
exposed to a significant amount of external risk. In Agell (1999, 2002) I show that more open 
economies on average tend to have higher union density, more centralised wage setting, more 
compressed wage structures, higher minimum wages, etc.  
  Where does this leave us? In the words of Krueger (2000, p. 132) “…when the dust 
settles I suspect that the competing forces of integration and demand for social protection will 
roughly balance out, and that the broad outlines of today’s labour compact in European 
nations will still be recognisable in the future”. In my view, this is as good a guess as any.    22
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 Table 1. Inequality indices according to the Luxembourg Income Study (mid to late 1990s) 
  90/10 decile 
ratio 









  Scandinavia 
Sweden  2.61  .221  6.6  2.6  5.3 
Finland   2.68  .226  5.4  2.8  6.9 
Denmark  2.83  .257  9.2  8.7  5.1 
Norway  3.15  .238  6.9  3.9  3.0 
 
  Northern and Continental Europe 
Luxembourg  2.92  .235  3.9  4.5  1.2 
Netherlands  3.15  .253  8.1  8.1  11.1 
Germany  3.18  .261  7.5  10.6  12.5 
Belgium  3.26  .255  8.0  7.7  7.5 
France  3.54  .288  8.0  7.9  10.7 
Switzerland  3.62  .307  9.3  10.0  -- 
Austria  3.73  .277  10.6  15.0  -- 
 
  Southern Europe 
Spain  3.96  .303  10.1  12.2  42.8 
Italy  4.77  .342  14.2  20.2  36.1 
 
  English-speaking countries 
Canada  4.13  .305  12.8  16.3  9.5 
Australia  4.33  .311  14.3  15.8  16.2 
Ireland  4.33  .325  12.3  14.4  21.4 
United Kingdom  4.57  .344  12.5  15.4  29.1 
United States  5.57  .372  17.0  21.9  13.9 
Sources: Numbers in columns 1-4 are from Smeeding (2002) and www.lisproject.org/keyfigures. Those in column 5 are from Bradbury and Jäntti (2002). 
Relative poverty is the percentage of individuals with a disposable income below 50 percent of the median disposable income. Absolute poverty is the 
percentage of children with real incomes below the official US poverty line. The square root of the number of household members is used as the 
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Figure 1. Relative child poverty versus social
              expenditure as a percentage of GDP
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Figure 2. Effect of globalisation on redistribution in  
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